

Continuous Secure Software Development and Analysis

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Problems



Security is not considered from beginning

- Violations are detected late → costly
- Hard to retrace decisions
 - \rightarrow later analyses run independent from previous decisions
 - \rightarrow changing situations leads to ... ?

Problems



Security is hard to evaluate

Hard to evaluate/ systematically check security requirements

 \rightarrow often done with threat models & scenarios

- Security is an evolving risk
- \rightarrow Security must be observed over time
- \rightarrow Necessary changes should be easy to detect

Problems



Security is difficult

- Multiple Aspects/ Topics
 - Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authenticity, ...
 - Security models often contain only few aspects
- Intrinsically dependent
 - Security leaks lead to other security lacks
 - Attackers often reach their goal by a sequence of attacks

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Related Work

Approaches

- [Ryoo et al.]
 - 1) Vulnerability-oriented: Expert interview
 - 2) Pattern-oriented: Analyze design patterns regarding identified vulnerabilities
 - 3) Tactic-oriented: Investigate handling of attacks

[Khan]


- In every development stage: Stage has issues \rightarrow later stages will have issues
- Requirement phase: Misuse case analysis to verify requirements
- Design phase: Use misuse cases and vulnerabilities to perform threat modeling
- → Adapt design
- Coding phase: Tests with static analyses and code reviews



- Holistic framework for multiple security aspects
- Appliable over time & react to changing requirements & contexts
- Blackboard principle: PCM
- Connect security and architecture
- Base on fine-grained, underlying assumptions

Vision






Implementation

Vision





Implementation

Architecture-based Analyses



Confidentiality Analysis


- Confidentiality
 - Information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals [ISO 27000]
 - Often ensured by access control

Idea

- Refine confidentiality assumptions to access control policies
- Formulate policies as constraints
- Verify policies through other analyses

Vision





Architecture- and Code-based Analyses



Composition of architecture- and code-based analyses

Some security aspects can only be verified on certain levels

- I.e., correctness on code level
- \rightarrow Others must base on assumptions
- \rightarrow If assumptions are false, analysis results are false

Idea

- Compose static security analyses of system view and source code
- Reduce failures through assumptions of analyzable aspects
- Analyze assumed aspects (on architecture level) using code-based analyses

Code-based Analyses



Code-level Specification and Verification of Security

Verification of underlying assumptions (of higher-level results)
Verification of reusable building blocks

Idea

- Use formal verification to verify specification of components
- Use protocol verification for security properties between components

Example – Access Control



Architecture level

- Use access control to achieve confidentiality
- How is the access control designed on architectural level?
- \rightarrow Multiple assumptions
- Architecture- and code-based level
 - What are underlying assumptions?
 - Role model is applied correctly?

Code-based level

Verify implementation of (parts of the) role model



Benefits

- Overviewable security
- \rightarrow Decisions & assumptions are explicit
- \rightarrow Security patterns/ mechanisms & assumptions are annotated
- \rightarrow Results of analyses are traced back to PCM
- Different analyses
- \rightarrow Combination of different aspects
- Security from beginning and to the end
- \rightarrow Early analyses are possible
- \rightarrow Later analyses can refine/ verify the results of the previous ones

Benefits



Threat models / Attack scenarios / Attack models

- \rightarrow I.e., attack needs some assumptions
- \rightarrow are these negated by the assumed security mechanisms?
- Risk management & Quantification
- \rightarrow I.e., risk of breaking some assumption
- \rightarrow Risk of breaking some security mechanisms





Reference	Source
Ryoo et al.	J. Ryoo, et al., Architectural analysis for security, IEEE Security & Privacy 13 (2015) 52– 59.
Khan	R. Khan, Secure software development: a prescriptive framework, Computer Fraud & Security 2011 (2011) 12–20.
Broadnax et al.	B. Broadnax, et al., Eliciting and refining requirements for comprehensible security, in: 11th Security Research Conference, Fraunhofer Verlag, Berlin, 2016, pp. 323–330.
ISO27000	ISO, ISO/IEC 27000:2018(E) Information technology – Security techniques – Information security management systems – Overview and vocabulary, Standard, 2018.